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Many natural systems have the potential to switch between alternative dynamic behaviors. We
consider a system with two distinct equations of motion that are separated by a threshold value
of the state variable. We show that utility maximization will give a decisionmaking rule that
is consistent with ecosystem-based management objectives that aim to reduce the probability
that the system crosses the threshold. Moreover, we ﬁnd that increasing uncertainty (both
uncertainty embedded in the natural system and uncertainty of the decisionmaker about the
location of the threshold) can lead to nonmonotonic changes in precaution. Although small
increases in uncertainty may at ﬁrst increase precaution, large enough increases in uncertainty
will lead to a decrease in precaution.
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1Many natural systems can be divided into domains with distinct system dynamics. In such
multistate systems, the equation of motion changes discontinuously or nonlinearly when system
variables such as climate, nutrient ﬂux, or human harvesting rates are changing gradually [20, 27].
For example, shifts in system dynamics have been observed in ecosystems such as freshwater
lakes [28], coral reefs [15], riparian meadows [6], tropical forests [29], and savanna [26]. At a
much larger scale, multiple stable states separated by discontinuous shifts are also thought to be
important processes in climate change and global biogeochemical cycles [3, 30]. A key feature
of multistate ecosystems is that environmental monitoring that occurs in one stable domain of the
system has little or no predictive power about proximity to a threshold and shifts to alternative sta-
bility domains [27]. Consequently, ecosystem management strategies that are based strictly around
the attainment of ﬁxed environmental targets, or that view small perturbations to such targets as
sustainable, may lead to unexpected, catastrophic collapse and accompanying ecologic and eco-
nomic damages to ecosystem functions [25]. Recent research in ecology has emphasized the need
to increase the resilience1 and stability domains of desirable ecosystem states as the primary goals
of scientiﬁcally-based ecosystem management [20, 27].
In this study, we analyze a multistate system with two distinct domains that are separated by a
possibly unknown, reversible threshold. We assume that the underlying stochastic natural process
and management actions together determine which domain the system is in, and thus the appropri-
ate equation of motion. The contributions of this paper are as follows: First, under our model setup
we obtain a differentiable value function, even at the threshold. Thus, while earlier studies had
to rely on numerical simulations, we use stochastic dynamic programming to obtain an analytical
solution as well as comparative statics results on precautionary behavior. Second, we show that
utility maximization yields a decision rule with precautionary behavior if the system is close to
the threshold, thereby increasing system resilience. Third, as the variance in the stochastic com-
ponent of the natural system that determines whether the threshold is passed increases, the level
of precautionary behavior may ﬁrst increase, but for large enough variance will eventually always
decrease. Fourth, we show that there is also a nonmonotonic relationship between the uncertainty
of the utility maximizer about the unknown threshold and precautionary behavior. Intuitively, if a
decisionmaker knows with certainty that he/she is right below the threshold, there is no expected
beneﬁt from engaging in precautionary reductions. Once uncertainty increases (either about the
natural system or the utility maximizer’s belief about the threshold), so does the probability that
1There are several deﬁnitions of resilience in the ecology literature. The Resilience Alliance research consortium
deﬁnes it as ”the capacity of an ecosystem to tolerate disturbance without collapsing into a qualitatively different state
that is controlled by a different set of processes.”
2the threshold will be crossed and hence precautionary reductions in loading have a payoff from
lowering that probability. If the uncertainty continues to grow, the decisionmaker will eventually
feel he/she has no knowledge at all and precautionary reductions will be too costly compared to
the negligible reduction in the probability that the threshold is crossed. These results are different
to previous results from analyses of both reversible multistate systems and reversible catastrophic
systems with instantaneous penalty functions, where it has been argued that increased threshold
uncertainty always leads to an increase in precautionary behavior [5, 18, 32, 33], or that the thresh-
old and associated uncertainty have no effect on precautionary behavior [25].
Several strands of economic research are relevant to the problem of optimal resource manage-
ment when catastrophic events can occur. The most common way of modeling catastrophes in
the economic literature is to consider catastrophic events as penalty functions with an associated
hazard rate. The state of the resource – and hence optimal economic behavior – may or may not
inﬂuence the probability of event occurrence. By using survival probability as a state variable,
the optimization problem can then be treated as a deterministic control problem. In general, an
irreversible catastrophe is viewed as instantaneously and permanently reducing social welfare to
zero (e.g. [9]), whereas a reversible catastrophe is modeled as imposing an instantaneous penalty
equaltothesumofdamagesfromthecatastrophesandhealingcostsfortheresource(e.g. [32,33]).
When catastrophic, irreversible thresholds exist, economic studies suggest that some precau-
tionary reduction in economic activity may be desirable. Examples of irreversible thresholds that
have been studied by economists include species extinction, collapse of thermohaline circulation
[17], disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet [24], and aquifer salinization [31, 33]. Many
of these studies ﬁnd that increasing uncertainty decreases the amount of managers’ precaution.
Clarke and Reed [9] show that an exogenous increase in the risk of catastrophe can increase or
decrease the degree of precaution undertaken by resource managers behaving optimally. Tsur and
Zemel [32, 33] argue that such nonmonoticity in behavior as a function of increasing risk is a
characteristic of irreversible catastrophes, resulting from the tradeoff as pollution levels increase
between increasing hazard rate and a decreasing penalty function (because the value function is
decreasing in pollution level). Conversely, Tsur and Zemel argue that for reversible events with an
instantaneous penalty function, increasing pollution increases both the hazard rate and the penalty,
so that exogenous increases in the risk of a catastrophe always increase the degree of precaution.
Finally, Tsur and Zemel [33] show that in the absence of exogenous uncertainty in pollution, when
the only uncertainty is in the location of the threshold, increasing uncertainty always makes the
3manager more careful. In these latter papers, it is never desirable to cross the threshold, and once
it has been located, it is never crossed again. Note that in this strand of literature, an increase in
uncertainty corresponds to an increase in the hazard rate. In our model this need not be the case
as the threshold separates domains with distinct system dynamics rather than representing an in-
stantaneous penalty function. Thus, depending on current state, an increase in uncertainty in our
model can increase or decrease the probability of switching between states.
A smaller body of literature considers thresholds not in terms of penalty functions but as points
or regions in which system behavior switches between alternative states, where one state is viewed
as more ‘desirable’ than the other, either in terms of economicor ecologicbeneﬁts. Most economic
models of environmental systems with reversible thresholds and multiple dynamic states assume
perfect knowledge of system dynamics and focus on target trajectories to optimal steady states
[2, 14, 19]. The majority of these studies have analyzed lake ecosystems, where excess nutrient in-
puts can cause switching from oligotrophic to eutrophic states. Such environmental systems have
been modeled in two ways. First, some studies use continuous nonconvex equations of motion
that show a rapid change in system behavior over a small interval (e.g. [2, 14, 16, 19]); to date,
these types of system have only been solved numerically. Second, some studies use multiple equa-
tions of motion with switches occurring when a threshold is crossed (e.g. [5, 18, 25]). In general,
these studies use numerical approximation methods and suggest that optimal policy choices are
insensitive to threshold proximity. An exception is Naevdal [23], who uses a deterministic optimal
control model with a jump equation at the threshold to obtain a mix of analytical and numerical
solutions and shows that for at least some parameter values, the optimal control ‘chatters’ around
the threshold.
Finally, a broad deﬁnition of a catastrophic event can include extinction of a renewable re-
source. Analysis of the conditions under which extinction may be optimal goes back to the de-
terministic model of Clark [7], who showed that if the resource growth rate is below the discount
rate, immediate extinction of the resource is economically rational. More recent work shows that
in stochastic systems, it is also necessary to consider characteristics of the welfare function, non-
concave biological growth functions, and the initial stock size in determining optimal outcome
[12, 21, 22]. Olson and Roy [21] ﬁnd that the choice between conservation and extinction may
be complex: for example, an increased but uncertain productivity can reduce the range of ini-
tial stocks for which conservation is efﬁcient, and therefore increase the likelihood of extinction.
There is also an analogous literature on optimal nonrenewable resource extraction, where extrac-
4tion occurs while the ultimate size of the resource is unknown (in this case, the ‘threshold’ event
is exhaustion of the resource). Cropper [11] showed that when reserves are uncertain, the optimal
path of planned extraction is no longer necessarily monotonic.
The paper is laid out as follows. In Section 1, we present the basic model we use in our
analysis. In the following section (Section 2), we derive results and analyze the case when there
is stochastic pollutant loading but the threshold location is known. In Section 3, we extend this
analysis to the case where threshold location is also uncertain. Following this, we reconcile the
differences between our results and those of previous studies in Section 4. Finally, we explain the
policy implications of our results.
1 Modeling framework
We begin by presenting a minimal model for the management of a multistate ecosystem with a
reversible threshold that describes the dynamics of an undesirable ecosystem pollutant or charac-





BXt + b + lt + vt + u1t if BXt + b + lt + vt < Xc
BXt + b + r + lt + vt + u2t if BXt + b + lt + vt ≥ Xc
(1)
The parameter B ∈ [0,1] represents the proportion of the pollutant X that carries over from one
period to thenext, b represents the mean natural inputof pollutantto the environmentalsystem, and
lt is the anthropogenic pollutant input. Uncertainty about the system dynamics is captured by the
parameters vt, u1t, and u2t, which are error terms with means µv = µu1 = µu2 = 0 and standard
deviations σv, σu1 and σu2.2 We assume that vt is normally distributed, but place no restrictions
on u1t and u2t. Two interpretations of our model are possible: if pollutant levels must be greater
than zero, then Xt can be taken to represent the logarithm of the amount of pollutant at time t, so
that the stochastic input terms follow a lognormal distribution. Alternatively, if we take Xt to be
the pollutant level relative to some baseline, and negative levels are allowed, then Xt can represent
the pollutant level relative to that baseline, and stochastic inputs are normally distributed. Either
of these interpretations is consistent with the model presented.
2Our baseline model assumes σu1 = σu2, but the above setup incorporates the case where the additional loading r





5The system represented by the equations for Xt+1 has two domains of behavior, separated by
a threshold at Xc which may or may not be known with certainty. We assume that when the pol-
lutant level is below Xc, the system is in a desirable stability domain, as for any given natural and
anthropogenic pollutant inputs, the expected pollutant level in the following period will be less
– by an amount equal to r > 0 – than when the current pollutant level is above Xc. A model
speciﬁcation similar to ours was used by Peterson et al. [25] to study the dynamics of a fresh-
water lake ecosystem. In that setting, the pollutant X represented phosphorus loading to the lake,
and r represented additional phosphorus recycling that occurred when the lake switched between
oligotrophic (desirable) and eutrophic (undesirable) states at the threshold Xc. Peterson et al.’s
model assumes that current management actions and pollutant loading have no effect on recycling
in the current period, but only in future time periods. In this paper, we make the more realistic
assumption that threshold crossings (such as caused by phosphorus recyling) depend not only on
the carryover from the previous period but also on current loading and an error component vt. An
intuitive interpretation of the error component vt is that it represents uncertainty in the natural
system. This may be because the threshold itself may be subject to some movement, ecosystem
processes operate at differing rates, or real ecological thresholds may involve multiple interacting
slow and fast variables [4]. The advantage of including vt is that the resulting value function is
concave, continuous, and differentiable, even at Xc. As a result, we are able to obtain an exact
analytical solution to the optimization problem, rather than requiring numerical approximations
such as those used in previous studies [5, 18]. Our approach allows us to analyze the range and
characteristics of optimal behavior in much greater detail than existing studies that use numerical
solution methods.
We assume that society derives economic beneﬁts from the ability to increase the pollutant
loading of the environmental system. These beneﬁts are given in each period by the utility function
U(lt,Xt) = klt − X2
t . Examples of such beneﬁts might include the capacity of ecosystems to
assimilate waste by-products from industry or agriculture, or the value of ecosystem functionality
in maintaining habitat. Note that from society’s point of view, the utility function shows a tradeoff
between the beneﬁts of allowing increased pollutant loading and the negative consequences of the
increased pollutant stock.
62 Optimal management with certain threshold location
We consider the problem of a decisionmaker choosing a value for the anthropogenic portion of
pollutant loading in each time period, lt, so as to maximize the discounted value of all future
utilities derived from the environmental system. We begin by assuming that the decisionmaker
knowstheexactlocationofthethreshold. Givenaper-perioddiscountfactorofδ, themaximization
problem is then given by















BXt + b + lt + vt + u1t if BXt + b + lt + vt < Xc
BXt + b + r + lt + vt + u2t if BXt + b + lt + vt ≥ Xc
(2)
where f1(u), f2(u), and g(v) are the density functions of u1, u2, and v, and F1(u), F2(u), and G(v)
are the corresponding cumulative density functions. Recall that all error terms are mean zero. We
assume that v is normally distributed, but place no restrictions on u1 and u2.
The Bellman equation of the value function that equals the discounted value of all future utili-
ties is





















V (BXt + lt + b + r + v + u)f2(u)du g(v)dv
 
(3)
For ease of notation, deﬁne c(Xt,lt) = BXt + lt + b. Note that the maximization in the Bellman
equation is with respect to loading lt, so that all other variables are constants. The next proposition
establishes that under the optimal loading ˆ lt, c(Xt,ˆ lt(Xt)) = BXt +ˆ lt(Xt)+b = ¯ c is independent
of Xt, which we use in the consecutive proof that the value function is differentiable (both proofs
are given in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 Under the optimal loading ˆ lt, c(Xt,ˆ lt(Xt)) is independent of Xt
This aries from the fact that the dynamic programming equation can be rewritten as














V (c + r + v + u)f2(u)du g(v)dv
 
− k[BXt + b] − X
2
t (4)
7Proposition 2 V (X) is concave and differentiable with V ′(X) = −Bk − 2X
We will brieﬂy outline the idea behind the second proof and give some intuition why the value
function is differentiable even at Xc.
The proof uses a contraction mapping argument. Contraction mappings have a unique ﬁxed
point, which is the value function: continuous application of the contraction mapping will lead to
convergence towards the value function. The ﬁrst step is to establish that the Bellman equation
constitutes a contraction mapping. In the second step we show that the Bellman equation maps
concave functions into concave functions. We can hence start with an arbitrary concave function,
and after repeatedly applying the contraction mapping, we will converge to the true value function,
which must be concave as well. In the third step we use the result of Benveniste and Scheinkman
[1] that gives conditions under which concave functions are differentiable.
The reason why the value function is differentiable even at Xc lies with the error term vt. Re-
call that vt enters the equation that determines whether the threshold is passed. Start with the case
where σv = 0, so that there is no uncertainty whether the threshold is crossed or not. If we slightly
perturb the loading BXt + b + lt around Xc, the equation of motion has a discrete discontinuous
jump equal to r > 0 and hence the value function would not be continuous either. However, as
long as σv > 0, there is no discrete jump as the system crosses the threshold dependent on whether
BXt+b+lt is less or more than Xc−vt. By design, vt has a continuous probability distribution,so
changing the combined loading shifts this continuous probability distribution of the discontinuous
jump, which ensures that the value function is itself differentiable. Note that σv can be as small as
desired, so long as it is nonzero.
Usingthefact thatV isdifferentiablewecannowsolvefortheoptimalloading ¯ cbymaximizing
the right hand side of the Bellman equation.
































The derivation is again given in the Appendix.
Several things deserve further explanation. First, the above equation includes the results of
[25] as special cases. A model with no additional input r is equivalent to saying that Xc = ∞,










= 1 and hence the expected stock in the next period






. On the other hand, if the additional input r is always present,
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in each case, which we call the target stock. Furthermore, let the precautionary reduction in next
period’s expected state variable be E[Xtarget − Xt+1], i.e. the drop in the state variable below the
level that is desirable if the manager knows whether the system is below or above the threshold Xc.
Figure 1 shows both the optimal combined loading ¯ c (left panel) and the expected state variable in
the next period (right panel). Each graph displays the solution for various values of σv, while all
other parameters are taken from [25].
Second, if the variances of the error terms u1 and u2 are the same, then they do not enter the
results at all, and have no inﬂuence on optimal loading. This is the case because we model a
reversible system and hence any arbitrary shock to the system can be completely counterbalanced
in the next period (and u does not impact whether the threshold X is crossed or not). As mentioned
before, if the additional loading r is not deterministic but itself random, then σ2
u2 > σ2
u1, which
further reduces ¯ c.
Third, uncertainty in the form of the error term v inﬂuences the optimal loading. Recall that the
error term v is partially responsible in determining whether the additional input r is present or not:
switching to the undesirable state occurs if BXt + lt + b + vt ≥ Xc. Uncertainty about whether
the threshold has been crossed and the additional input r is present induces the decisionmaker to
become more cautious so that the following period’s expected state variable is below Xtarget in
the right panel of Figure 1. We brieﬂy establish that the precautionary reduction in next period’s
expected pollutant stock E[Xtarget − Xt+1] is nonnegative.
Proposition 4 A sufﬁcient condition for the precautionary reduction E[Xtarget − Xt+1] to be non-
negative is Xc > 0















the solution for ¯ c in Proposition 3 we get





Xc − ¯ c
σv
  








We now consider the relationship between uncertainty in pollutant loading and precautionary
behavior in more detail.









2 if σv → ∞
























Xc − ¯ c
σv
 




Since 0 < Φ() < 1 and 0 < φ() < 1 √
2π we know that ¯ c has to be bounded for σv ≥ 1. Hence,
Xc − ¯ c is bounded as well and the ratio Xc−¯ c










The intuition is as follows: as uncertainty in the random element of pollutant loading v in-
creases, the manager’s actions have less and less inﬂuence on which state the environmental sys-
tem will be in, and the probability that the system will be in either state approaches one half.
Thus, the optimal loading includes a term that approaches r/2, representing the expected addi-







. The right graph of Figure 1 shows that the next period’s expected state vari-






if σv increases. It is reasonable to ask whether
an increase in uncertainty σv gives less incentive for precaution and always increases the optimal
loading. As the next proposition shows, such monotonicity of behavior is not found. To the con-
trary, for all possible parameter assumptions one can ﬁnd a critical value Xc such that an increase
in σv will decrease the optimal loading, increasing precaution as uncertainty increases.
Proposition 6 For all values of parameters B,k,r,δ, and σv, there exists a critical level Xc such
that an increase in the variance σ2
v decreases the optimal loading ¯ c.
Proof: We will show that there exists a critical level for which d¯ c







It is shown in the Appendix that the the optimal combined loading under these parameters is
¯ c =   Xc − σv. This simpliﬁes equations as Φ
 
  Xc−¯ c
σv
 
= Φ(1) and φ
 




Using this result in the derivative obtained after totally differentiating the equation that implic-















[rφ(1)+σv] r + r2 + ∆σ2
u]
 











v − 2rσv[1 − Φ(1)] − φ(1)[Bkr + r2 + ∆σ2
u]
[rφ(1) + σv]













v + 2r2σv[Φ(1) + φ(1) − 1] + σv[r2 + ∆σ2
u]
 
which is positive as 0 < δ,B < 1 and hence
1
δ − B > 0 as well as Φ(1) + φ(1) − 1 > 0.
The proceeding proposition implies that for all values of the parameters B,k,r,δ, and σv,
there is a critical threshold level for which the regulator becomes more cautious as uncertainty
in pollutant loading increases. While one can always ﬁnd a threshold level Xc such that d¯ c
dσv is
negative, it is also true that for ﬁxed parameter values and threshold Xc, this derivative becomes
positive as σv increases, so that the level of precaution ultimately decreases.
Proposition 7 For given parameters including Xc, the optimal loading is increasing in σv once σv
becomes large.
Proof: From Proposition5 we knowthat Xc−¯ c


































r + Xc−¯ c
2σ2




dσv > 0as alltermsthatcouldpotentiallybenegativeapproach zero at afasterrate.
Extremely large values of σv correspond to the case where the manager’s actions have almost
no effect on the probability of a threshold crossing occuring. Thus, if anthropogenic pollutant
loading has almost no inﬂuence on whether a threshold crossing will occur, a reduced level of
precaution and increased loading are optimal, as any reduction in loading is too costly compared
to the negligible reduction in the probability of crossing the threshold.
We have shown that the total deterministic pollutant loading in any period, ¯ c, consisting of
the sum of carry-over from the previous period, natural background inputs (not including r), and
(optimal) anthropogenic inputs, does not depend on the current pollutant level. The optimal pollu-
tant loading ¯ c changes nonlinearly as the threshold Xc between stability domains changes (Figure
1). As Xc becomes very large, it becomes very unlikely that transition into the undesirable state




δ − B] (where δ is the
per-period discount rate), which is then also equal to the expected pollutant stock in the next time
period. Conversely, when Xc becomes small, so that additional loading equal to r is present and
transition from the undesirable state to the desirable state is very unlikely, the optimal loading ap-
proaches k
2[1
δ −B]−r, while the expected pollutant stock in the next period once again approaches
the target level. Importantly however, for intermediate values of Xc, the optimal pollutant loading
may be much less than that for both small and large values of Xc, and as a result the next period’s
expected state variable may be much less than the target level predicted when Xc is either small or
large (Figure 1). The intuitionbehind these results is as follows: if the threshold is either extremely
low or extremely high then precautionary activity is unwarranted. In the former case, decreasing
loading will not signiﬁcantlychange the probabilityof transitionout of theundesirablestate. In the
latter case, additional precaution will decrease the probability of transitioning into the undesirable
state only negligibly. However, if there is a possibility of moving between states in either direc-
tion, then additional precautionary activity carries an expected economic beneﬁt. Note that our
result assumes a reversible process. With an irreversible or hysteretic threshold, the decisionmaker
would presumably have an even larger incentive to avoid crossing a threshold into the undesirable
state. Finally, we have demonstrated that there is a nonmontonic relationship between increasing
uncertainty in the natural system (as represented by the error term vt) and the optimal combined
loading ¯ c, i.e. increasing uncertainty can ﬁrst decrease the optimal loading but will eventually al-
ways increase it. Intuitively, if a manager is absolutely certain that the system is right below the
threshold, then any precautionary reduction is unwarranted. Once uncertainty about the natural
system increases, so does the probability of crossing the threshold, and hence it might be worth-
while to reduce loadings for a reduction in the probability of crossing the threshold. However, if
the uncertainty about the natural system continues to increase, any reduction in loadings implies
only a negligible reduction in the probability of crossing the threshold and hence is too costly.
123 Optimal management with uncertain threshold location
To make our problem more realistic we next assume that the decisionmaker is aware of the exis-
tence of the threshold Xc between stability domains, but is uncertain of its location. Deﬁne the
probability distribution over the critical value as h(Xc). Hence the dynamic programming equa-
tion (4) now becomes (using conditional expectations ans dropping the time subscript for ease of
notation):




















− k[BX + b] − X
2 (5)
The ﬁrst order condition is the same as in the previous section except that there is an additional
integration over Xc. More formally, the revised ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal combined
loading becomes



















Xc − ¯ c
σv
   
h(Xc)dXc


































Note that the solution is simply a weighted average of the optimal ¯ c under certainty, where the
weight is given by beliefs over the critical threshold h(Xc). As before, if the decisionmaker be-









δ − B] − r respectively; the expected pollutant stock
in the next period, E[Xt+1], approaches Xtarget = k
2[1
δ − B] in both cases. However, if the deci-
sionmaker is uncertain about the location of the threshold, it is economically optimal to undertake
some precautionary reduction in pollutant loading. Intuitively, we are integrating over the optimal
¯ c in the left graph of Figure 1. This explains why an increase in uncertainty can lead to both an
increase and a decrease in the optimal loading. For the former, assume that h(Xc) places all mass
on Xc where ¯ c(Xc) is at its minimum, e.g. around Xc = 0.4 for σv = 0.2 in the left graph of
Figure 1. An increase in uncertainty implies that more probability mass is put on Xc where it does
not pay to be cautious and ¯ c is larger. Alternatively, a decrease in the optimal loading is feasible if
initially h(Xc) places most mass on outcomes of Xc where ¯ c is large, e.g., Xc = 1.4,σv = 0.2 in
the left graph of Figure 1. Increasing the uncertainty will shift more weight on cases where it pays
to be cautious and reduce the loading.
Before we examinethecomparativestatics resultswith respect to an increase in theutilitymax-
13imizer’s uncertainty about the critical threshold Xc, we brieﬂy show that precautionary reductions
in loadings are equivalent to reductions in the expected state variable in the next period below the
target level. This is necessary as the expected pollutant stock in the next period is a function both
of the loading and the endogenous probability that the threshold is crossed.
Proposition 8 An increase in σXc increases the precautionary reduction in the state variable
E[Xtarget − Xt+1] if and only if it decreases the optimal loading ¯ c.

































How important is threshold uncertainty in inducing the decisionmaker to reduce pollutant load-
ings as a precautionary measure? In the context of our model, expected ecosystem resilience can
be deﬁned as the expected difference between the threshold and the pollutant stock in the next
period, E[Xc − Xt+1]. With this deﬁnition, a large positive value implies high resilience of the
desirable state and a large negative value implies high resilience of the undesirable state. When
the decisionmaker is almost certain that the ecosystem will not switch between states – whether
it is currently in the desirable or the undesirable state – the expected pollutant stock approaches
the previously deﬁned target level Xtarget. A measure of the extent to which uncertainty about
the location of the threshold induces reductions in pollutant loading in the economic optimum is
thus given by the difference between the target level and the pollutant stock that is expected in the
next period when an optimum policy is followed, namely E[Xtarget −Xt+1]. This follows because
expected ecosystem resilience E[Xc − Xt+1] can be decomposed into the difference between the
critical level and a constant target level if resilience is high (Xc − Xtarget), as well as additional
precautionary reductions belowthis target level(E[Xtarget−Xt+1]). This enables us to look at what
happens to the optimal loading and precautionary reduction in the next period’s pollution stock.
Proposition 9 An increase in the variance σ2
Xc can result in nonmonotonic behavior in precau-
tionary reductions, e.g. it can ﬁrst decrease and then increase the optimal loading ¯ c.
Totallydifferentiatingtheequation thatdeﬁnes theoptimal ¯ c in case thethresholdis unknowngives

































r + Xc−¯ c
2σ2






















































   
r + Xc−¯ c
2σ2
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is positiveif Xc ∈ (µXc−σXc,µXc+σXc)




µXc t1(Xc)dXc = 0. Hence,
if most of the weight is shifted on regions where t1 is negative, the overall integral will be negative.
If µXc − σXc > ¯ c then the ratio Xc−¯ c
σv will be zero for a value   Xc < µXc − σXc, i.e., where t1











rapidly approaches zero as one deviates from



















2Xcr + r2 + ∆σ2
u]t1h(Xc)dXc < 0.
Now consider the denominator: since all terms except Xc−¯ c
σv are positive, and
  Xc−¯ c
σv = 0, it is
easy to construct a case where the denominator is positive.
A negative numerator combined with a positive denominator implies that the optimal loading
decreases as σXc increases. The intuition is very similar to the nonmonotonicity with respect to
σv in the certainty case (as the uncertainty about the natural system is replaced with uncertainty
of the utility maximizer about the location of the threshold). An example of the nonmonotonic-
ity is displayed in Figure 2. The x-axis displays the system resilience (Xc − Xtarget), i.e. larger
positive values indicate that the target level (the desired pollution stock if the system were for
sure in either state for sure) is further below the critical value Xc. The y-axis displays the un-
certainty σXc. The graph displays contour maps of the precautionary reduction in the expected
pollution stock E[Xtarget − Xt+1]. The grey areas indicate the regions where an increase in σXc
(movingup vertically)will increase theprecautionary reduction in next period’s pollutionstock (or
equivalently reduce the optimal loading). The white areas, on the other hand, indicate the region
where an increase in σXc reduces theprecautionary reductionin next period’spollutionstock.3
As expected ecosystem resilience and the decisionmaker’s uncertainty about threshold location
change, there is a wide variation in the degree of optimal precautionary activity (Figure 2). Even if
3We should note that similar results are obtained for various combinations of the parameters, i.e. it is not the result
of one particular set of parameter assumptions.
15the decisionmaker believes that the ecosystem is in the desirable state (has positiveresilience), it is
economically optimal to undertake precautionary reductions in loading. The relationship between
precautionary reductions in loading and uncertainty about the threshold location is nonmonotonic.
The parameter space of threshold uncertainty and expected resilience is divided into regions where
increasing uncertainty increases the level of precaution and regions where increasing uncertainty
decreases the level of precaution (Figure 2). For a given expected resilience, as uncertainty in-
creases, it may be optimal ﬁrst to increase precaution and then to decrease precaution. This result
is one of our key ﬁndings, and has an intuitive explanation. If the decisionmaker is almost certain
that ecosystem resilience is very high – in either state – then it is quite unlikely that any combi-
nation of management actions and random shocks will lead to a transition between states. Thus,
a large precautionary reduction in loading is unwarranted as net beneﬁts are almost certain to be
negligible. On the other hand, if the decisionmaker believes that ecosystem resilience is high, but
is unsure of this, then it is possible that transition between states will occur. If resilience is thought
to be negative, the possibility of transition to the desirable state is a good outcome, and thus war-
rants a precautionary reduction in loading. If resilience is thought to be positive, the possibility
of transition to the undesirable state is a bad outcome, and once again a precautionary reduction
in loading is economically justiﬁed. This explains why an initial increase in precautionary load
reduction can be optimal as uncertainty increases. However, eventually, an increase in uncertainty
will always reduce precautionary reductions in loadings (Figure 2); if the decisionmaker believes
that the threshold could be almost anywhere, a large reduction in loading is no longer optimal as
the economic beneﬁts are no longer well deﬁned.
We have shown that nonmonotonicity can exist for intermediate values of σXc and now extend
the analysis to the limiting case where the uncertainty again approaches inﬁnity.
Proposition 10
d¯ c
dσXc approaches zero for σXc → ∞
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will be close to zero. Hence the denominator approaches one as
the integral approaches zero.
16Similarly, the integral in the numerator is bounded and since it is divided by σXc it will ap-
proach zero once σXc → ∞. This implies that the entire fraction will approach zero.
4 Discussion
Our results are different to those reported in previous analyses of both reversible catastrophic sys-
tems with instantaneous penalty functions (where it has been argued that increased uncertainty
always leads to an increase in precautionary behavior [32, 33]) and reversible multistate systems
(where it has been argued that threshold uncertainty has little or no effect on precautionary behav-
ior [18, 25]). How can these differences be reconciled?
When the catastrophic event is modeled as an instantaneous penalty, as in Tsur and Zemel’s
[32, 33] studies, an increase in uncertainty corresponds to an increase in the risk of event occur-
rence, and thus always increases precautionary behavior. In a multistate system, uncertainty in
pollutant loadings has a more complicated effect. In particular, large negative shocks in pollutant
loading will reduce the pollutant stock, and may move the system from the undesirable to the de-
sirable state (i.e. a positive utility shock, as the value function is decreasing in X), even when
it may not be economically optimal to do so. As a result, increased uncertainty in the stochastic
component of pollutant loading does not always increase precaution in a multistate reversible sys-
tem. Indeed, for a large enough uncertainty, increasing the variance of the stochastic component
of pollutant loading will always decrease caution, as in this case, the anthropogenic component of
pollutant loading has almost no inﬂuence on the probability of a threshold crossing occurring.
The results of our study are also quite different from those reported in previous studies of
multistate environmental systems [5, 18, 25]. Several of these studies have also suggested that
increased threshold uncertainty always increases the degree of precaution [5, 18]. Whereas we
derive exact analytical solutions to the decisionmaker’s problem, previous studies used numerical
approximations to calculate optimal policies, which may have limited the parameter space con-
sidered and the resolution of observable optimal behavior. Indeed, some of the results presented
in both Carpenter et al. [5] and Ludwig et al. [18] show a nonmonotonic relationship between
uncertainty and precaution analogous to that found in this study. However, because of the coarse
resolution of the numerical approximations used, this nonmonotonicity is either unreported [5] or
reported as a numerical artifact [18]. In light of our analysis, an alternativeinterpretation is that the
17level of precaution may increase or decrease as uncertainty is resolved in a broad class of models
with unknown thresholds, whether these thresholds are reversible, hysteretic, or irreversible. Fi-
nally, Peterson et al. [25] suggest that mistaken overconﬁdence in system parameters leads naive
managers to overload pollutant inputs to ecosystems because the optimal strategy is insensitive to
the existence of a threshold, causing cycles of collapse and recovery. While recurrent overloading
of an ecosystem may well lead to its collapse, in Peterson et al.’s model mismanagement results
because the decisionmaker is not allowed to recognize that a threshold exists, rather than as an
inherent feature of utility maximization. An important result of our study is that if the existence of
a threshold is suspected, some precaution is warranted even under uncertainty about its location.
Many versions of the precautionary principle have been proposed to justify reductions in the
level of polluting activities in the face of large uncertainty about the consequences of such ac-
tivities [13]. Our analysis gives both an economic justiﬁcation for precautionary reductions in
pollutant loading – in terms of the expected economic gains – and a more nuanced view of how
beliefs about system thresholds should affect precautionary behavior. In particular, a decrease in
uncertainty about the location of a threshold may either increase or decrease the desirable level
of precaution, depending on the expected resilience of the ecosystem as well as the initial level
of uncertainty. Thus, stakeholder conﬂict in some kinds of environmental dispute may be a result
of different beliefs about threshold proximity and uncertainty, even when there is broad consensus
about underlying processes and system dynamics. For example, current views on climate change
policy can be broadly divided into those that are pessimistic and those that are optimistic. Climate
change pessimistsadvocate for an immediatereduction in the production of greenhouse gases until
uncertainty abouttheprocesses ofclimatechangeis reduced. Conversely, climatechange optimists
suggest that no costly reductions in greenhouse gas production shouldbe undertaken until thesame
uncertainty about climate change is reduced. Our analysis suggests that there may be much more
common ground between these two views than might otherwise be thought: both optimists’ and
pessimists’ views can be consistent with the same underlying economic or ecologic objectives and
expected system resilience, and their differences can be attributed to different beliefs about the un-
certainty with which important thresholds are known (as an illustrativeexample, if both pessimists
and optimists assume a system resilience Xc − Xtarget = 0.2 in Figure 2, but pessimists believe
σXc = 0.4 while optimists believe σXc = 0.1, then a reduction in uncertainty σXc would warrant
increased precaution for the former and decreased precaution for the latter).
Our analysis contains several key insights for the choice and implementation of ecosystem
18management policies. In our model of an ecosystem with an unknown, reversible threshold, com-
monly stated goals for managing multistate ecosystems – maintaining resilience and applying a
precautionary principle in decisionmaking – are completely consistent with, and can be justiﬁed
by, economic theory. Thus, we suggest that economic optimization approaches and empirical
scientiﬁc approaches for ecosystem management are quite complementary. Thus, the kinds of
policies suggested by economic analysis, including incentive-based management schemes such as
taxes, subsidies, and tradable permit markets, and some command-and-control approaches, should
be considered as potential instruments for scientiﬁcally-based ecosystem management in the pres-
ence of thresholds. In particular, it may be effective to take the current regulatory framework and
adjust the level of existing damaging activities based on both expected ecosystem resilience and
uncertainty. This proposal may be viewed as an economically-derived equivalent to the concept of
“bet-hedging” against uncertainty [8, 10]. Such adjustments may be considerably easier to imple-
ment than large-scale stakeholder involvement schemes and would be both ﬂexible and adaptable
to future advances in scientiﬁc knowledge about ecosystem dynamics.
5 Conclusions
Many natural systems have the potential to switch between alternative system dynamics. We ana-
lyze a multistate system with two distinct domains, each with its own equation of motion. While
earlier studies of multistatesystems rely on numerical simulations,by considering both uncertainty
of threshold location and a random component to the underlying dynamic natural process we are
able to formulate the manager’s decision as a stochastic dynamic programming problem and show
that the value function is differentiable, even at the threshold. We show that utility maximization
leads to a decision rule with precautionary behavior that increases system resilience, if the system
is thought to be close to the threshold. We ﬁnd that increasing uncertainty (both uncertainty associ-
ated with natural processes and uncertainty of thedecisionmakerabout threshold location)can lead
to nonmonotonic changes in precautionary actvity. In particular, as the variance in the stochastic
component of the natural system increases, the level of precautionary activity may ﬁrst increase,
but for large enough variance, precaution will eventually always decrease. Similarly, there is also
a nonmonotonic relationship between the uncertainty of the utility maximizer about the unknown
threshold and precautionary behavior. If the decisionmaker is certain that he/she is right below
the threshold, there is no expected beneﬁt from engaging in precautionary activities. If uncertainty
about threshold location increases, so does the probability that the threshold will be crossed and
19hence precautionary reductions in loading have a payoff from lowering that probability. If the
uncertainty continues to grow, precautionary reductions in loading eventually become too costly
compared to the negligible reduction in the probability that the threshold is crossed.
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23Figure 1: Optimal Loading and Expected Pollutant Stock under Certainty for Various σv



























































































Notes: Theleft graphdisplays the optimalloading ¯ c = BX+l+b as a functionof the critical valueXc, the rightgraph
displays the next period’s expected pollutant stock E[Xt+1] as a function of Xc. The constant target level Xtarget, the
expectedlevel in the next periodif a managerwere to assume that the system is in either state with certainty(i.e. above
or below the critical value without a chance of switching) is added as a dotted line to the right panel. For limXc→−∞
and limXc→∞, the expected stock approaches this target level Xtarget. However, if this target level is close to the
critical level X, additional precaution is optimal to avoid transition to the undesirable state. Parameter values used
follow Peterson et al. [25] where: k = 1.5,δ = 0.99,B = 0.1,b = 0.02,r = 0.2,σ2
v = 0.02.













































































Notes: Graph displays contour sets of precautionary reductions in loading as a function of the system resilience
Xc − Xtarget and uncertainty about the critical level, σXc, with other parameter values as in Figure 1. The areas
shaded gray represent regions of the parameter space for which increasing uncertaintyabout the expected resilience of
the system leads to a reduction in loading. Unshaded areas represent regions for which increasing uncertainty about
expected resilience leads to an increase in loading. The dotted line separates the two states of the ecosystem, with the
desirable state on the right-hand side and the undesirable state on the left-hand side. Thus, increasing positive values
of expected resilience refer to increasing resilience of the desirable state, and increasing negative values of expected
resilience refer to increasing resilience of the undesirable state.
25Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Under the optimal loading ˆ lt, c(Xt,ˆ lt(Xt)) is independent of Xt
Proof: Rewriting the Bellman equation using the fact that additive constants do not inﬂuence the
optimal load ˆ lt we get
V (Xt) = max
lt
 











V (BXt + lt + b + r + v + u)f2(u)du g(v)dv
 
− k[BXt + b] − X2
t
Note that lt only enters the maximization in the form of c = BXt + lt + b, and hence the above
problem is equivalent to














V (c + r + v + u)f2(u)du g(v)dv
 
− k[BXt + b] − X
2
t
And hence the optimal solution ¯ c is independent of Xt.
Proof of Proposition 2: V (X) is concave and differentiable with V ′(X) = −Bk − 2X
Proof: We will ﬁrst show that the dynamic programming problem constitutes a contraction map-
ping and maps concavefunctioninto concavefunctions. This in turnimpliesthat thevaluefunction


















m(c(X,l) + r + v + u)f2(u)du g(v)dv
 
We can show that T constitutes a contraction mapping using Blackwell’s sufﬁcient conditions:
































n(c(X,l) + r + v + u)f2(u)du g(v)dv
 
as m(x) ≤ n(x) pointwise and the integral is a linear operator
= T(n)
(ii) Discounting: For all a ≥ 0 there exits δ < 1 with
T(m + a) = max
l
 




























m(c(X,l) + r + v + u)f2(u)du g(v)dv
 
+ δa
= T(m) + δa
The second line follows from the fact that the densities f1(u),f2(u) integrate to one.
Points (i) and (ii) are sufﬁcient to show that T is a contraction mapping. This implies that we can
start with an arbitrary function m() and repeated application of T will converge to the unique ﬁxed
point, the true value function.
We will next show that T maps concave functions into concave functions. Hence, if we start
with a concave function m and repeatedly apply T, all resulting functions will be concave as well.
This implies that the unique attractor, the true value function, is concave as well.
Concavity: ∀X1,X2 ∈ R+ deﬁne the optimal loading as ˆ l1 and ˆ l2, respectively. Note that
for the convex combination X3 = θX1 + (1 − θ)X2, where θ ∈ (0,1), the convex combination
















m(c(X3,l) + r + v + u)f2(u)du g(v)dv
 
≥ k¯ l3 − X2
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− [θX1 + (1 − θ)X2]2
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c(X1,ˆ l1) + r + v + u
 
+ (1 − θ)
 
c(X2,ˆ l2) + r + v + u
  
f2(u)du g(v)dv
Thesecond lineuses thefact that¯ l3 is feasibleand hencethevalueundertheoptimumby deﬁnition
has to be at least as high. The third line uses the deﬁnition of X3 and ˆ l3. Using Proposition 1 in the
above equation, namely that c(X1,ˆ l1) = c(X2,ˆ l2) = ¯ c we get (the second line utilizes the fact that
both m and −x2 are concave functions).
[T(m)](X3) ≥ k
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= θ[T(m)](X1) + (1 − θ)[T(m)](X2)
The last two lines are simple rearrangements and deﬁnition of the value function. We hence know
that the unique attractor, the value function V (X) is concave.
28We are now equipped to show the differentiability of the value function with the help of the
theorem by [1]. Deﬁne ˆ l(Xc) as the optimal strategy if the threshold is Xc. Now deﬁne
W(X) = k
 
ˆ l(X0) + B [X0 − X]
 










c(X,¯ l) + v + u
 







c(X,¯ l) + r + v + u
 
f2(u)du g(v)dv
      
independent of X
Thus, all perturbations in X around X0 are immediately offset in the ﬁrst period by an adjustment
in the loading equal to B [X0 − X]. The advantage of W is that the payoff in future periods is
independent of X and only depends on X0, as by deﬁnition c(X,¯ l) = BX + ¯ l + b = BX +
ˆ l(X0) + B[X0 − X] + b = BX0 + ˆ l(X0) + b.
Note that W(X) is deﬁned on a neighborhood around X0. Clearly, W(X) is concave, dif-
ferentiable at X0, and W(X) ≤ V (X) as W(X) uses just one feasible strategy ¯ l out of the set of
possiblestrategieswhosemaximumyieldsV (X). Furthermore, byconstructionW(X0) = V (X0).
Using the above result that V (X) is concave, as well as the theorem of [1], it follows that V (X) is
differentiable at X0 as well and V ′(X0) = W ′(X0) = −Bk − 2X0
Corollary: The critical level Xc inﬂuences the value function only as an additive constant α
Given that V ′(X) = −Bk − 2X, we also know that the value function is given by V (X) =
α − BkX − X2 .
































Proof: Maximizing the right hand side of the Bellman equation by setting the derivative with
respect to ¯ c equal to zero we get
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29Examining terms on the right hand side and using the deﬁnitions of V (X) and V ′(X), we get
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Putting things together, the ﬁrst-order condition becomes
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Proof of Proposition 6 For all values of parameters B,k,r,δ, and σv, there exists a critical level
Xc such that an increase in the variance σ2
v decreases the optimal loading ¯ c.
Proof: First, we will show that using the above parameters the optimal loading ¯ c =   Xc−σv. Using
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= 0
The ﬁrst line is the equation that deﬁnes ¯ c. The second line uses the proposed ¯ c =   Xc − σv. The
third line factors out   Xc before the fourth line uses the expression for   Xc.
Second, to get
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It is positive as 0 < δ,B < 1 implies that 1
δ − B > 0 and Φ(1) + φ(1) − 1 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 9 An increase in the variance σ2
Xc can result in nonmonotonic behavior in
precautionary reductions, e.g., it can ﬁrst decrease and then increase the optimal loading ¯ c.
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